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Entry, Access and Facilities-Based Competition 
Randal C. Picker* 
 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is wide-ranging, but 
among its most important provisions are those designed, in the 
FCC’s words, “to let anyone enter any communications busi-
ness—to let any communications business compete in any mar-
ket against any other.”1 But the 1996 Act is about more than 
just creating competition. A key issue is precisely what type of 
competition is supposed to take place. For a telecommunica-
tions outsider, that must seem obscure, but insiders know that 
the core dispute is over facilities-based competition and—and 
now we do not have an agreed on phrase—non facilities-based 
competition but perhaps more precisely, in some cases, pure 
resale competition, and in other cases, shared-facilities compe-
tition. Of course, the conventional path to competition for 
most firms in most industries is facilities-based competition. 
You have your restaurant, I have mine, and we do not share a 
kitchen. In shared-facilities competition, we share many—in 
some cases all—of the same facilities and compete over price or 
services layered on top of the common facilities. Think one 
kitchen maybe even one restaurant, but different food, perhaps 
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you serve Italian on Tuesdays, while I serve Chinese on 
Wednesdays. 
The 1996 Act takes three important steps to push forward 
local wireline competition. First, it trumps state laws barring 
entry into telecommunications services.2 At the state level, en-
try into network industries is often controlled through certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity rules, which require a poten-
tial entrant to first obtain a license before entering. The 1996 
Act eliminated these barriers to entry, be it facilities-based or 
otherwise. Second, the Act quarantines the regional bell oper-
ating companies (“RBOCs”)—the main providers of ordinary 
local telephone service—by barring them from providing long-
distance phone service to their local phone customers.3 The 
RBOCs, though, are given a carrot: the quarantine ends so that 
they can provide long-distance service to their local-phone cus-
tomers if the FCC finds that a statutory standard for local 
competition has been met. That standard is usually described as 
having two tracks—A and B4—but both are keyed to the status 
of a “facilities-based” competitor.5 
Third, and finally, the Act requires that all incumbent local 
exchange carriers (“ILECs”) deal with rivals in three ways. The 
ILEC must interconnect with rivals; must provide access to 
rivals to parts of its network—unbundled network elements 
(“UNEs”)—at cost-based prices; and must sell to rivals at 
wholesale prices full-blown telecommunications services, which 
                                                  
2 47 U.S.C. § 253(a). 
3 47 U.S.C. § 271. 
4 See, e.g., Qwest approval order at ¶ 20 [see also qwest website at 
http://www.qwest.com/about/policy/ldReentry/Fed271/index.html; and the FCC 
website at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/in-region_applications/]. 
5 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1). For discussion, see SBC Communications, Inc v. FCC, 
138 F.3d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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rivals can in turn resell to their customers.6 The latter makes 
possible a straightforward version of pure resale competition. 
The facilities sharing rules of the 1996 Act have proven to 
be perhaps its most contentious feature. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has twice considered these rules, addressing the scope of 
sharing in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board7 and the meth-
odology used for determining the price at which sharing should 
take place in Verizon Communications v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission.8 Iowa Utilities overturned the FCC’s initial 
set of rules implementing the sharing provisions of the 1996 
Act. Verizon validated the so-called TELRIC pricing scheme 
adopted by the FCC.9 In May, 2002, in United States Telecom 
Ass’n v. FCC (USTA I), the D.C. Circuit found the FCC’s sec-
ond set of rules wanting.10 And in March, 2004, in United 
States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA II), the D.C. Circuit over-
turned core aspects of the FCC’s third set of rules.11  
USTA I also considered a separate but related set of sharing 
rules addressing broadband service. In what the court denomi-
nated the “Line Sharing Order,”12 the FCC had added addi-
tional unbundling rules for the local copper loop, that is, the 
core last-mile wires running from a central telephone facility to 
                                                  
6 47 U.S.C. § 251(c). 
7 525 US 366 (1999). 
8 122 S Ct 1646 (2002). For detailed discussion of the results in these cases, see 
Douglas Lichtman & Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications: 
Iowa Utilities and Verizon, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41 (2003). 
9 Total element long-run incremental cost if you really must know. 
10 United States Telecom Ass’n. v FCC, 290 F3d 415 (DC Cir 2002). 
11 xxx F.3d xxx (D.C. Cir., March 2, 2004). 
12 In the Matters of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Tele-
communications Capability and Implementation of the Local Competition Provi-
sions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 FCC Rcd 20912 (1999). 
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homes and businesses. While those wires look pretty basic to 
the naked eye, in fact, they can be divided into, as it were, 
channels with different transmissions traveling over different 
channels. Indeed, transmissions can run over the same wires 
simultaneously at various frequencies. Standard analog tele-
phone service uses low frequencies, leaving the higher-
frequency channel of the copper wire for other uses, such as 
high-speed data transmission. Broadband service over copper 
wires is known as digital subscriber line service or DSL. In the 
Line Sharing Order, the FCC ordered the separate unbundling 
of the high-frequency part of the copper loop. That meant that 
a potential broadband entrant did not need to buy access to the 
entire copper loop, including the (for it) unnecessary low-
frequency part of the loop. 
USTA I overturned the line-sharing order, in addition to 
rejecting the FCC’s second set of general unbundling rules. 
The D.C. Circuit stayed its result to give the FCC to put new 
rules in place, but even before the D.C. Circuit result, the FCC 
had concluded that it should review the general sharing rules 
every three years. To comply with the D.C. Circuit’s deadline, 
the FCC announced its third set of sharing rules, including 
new sharing rules for broadband, on February 20, 2003,13 but it 
did not actually issue the orders implementing the new rules 
until August 21, 2003. 
It is the rare FCC order that makes for front-page news, 
but perhaps the extent of coverage reflects accurately FCC 
Chairman Michael Powell’s view that the February 20
th rulings 
complete one of the FCC’s “most significant proceedings 
                                                  
13 See “FCC Adopts New Rules for Network Unbundling Obligations of Incum-
bent Local Phone Carriers,” Press Release of February 20, 2003 (available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-231344A1.pdf).  
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art33Picker  Entry, Access and Facilities-Based Competition  5 
 
ever.”14 The new sharing rules, adopted by a 3-2 vote, also rep-
resented a rare defeat for a sitting chair of the FCC. As Powell 
made clear in his dissenting statement, he saw the revised but 
still quite broad sharing rules as inconsistent with promoting 
facilities-based competition.15 
And the third set of rules barely survived their first birth-
day. In USTA II, the D.C. Circuit rejected large chunks of the 
third set of sharing rules. In giving the FCC just 60 days to 
issue revised rules, the court emphasized “the Commission’s 
failure, after eight years, to develop lawful unbundling rules, 
and its apparent unwillingness to adhere to prior judicial rul-
ings.” 
As that makes clear, we are now eight years in on the shar-
ing regime launched by the 1996 Act and yet we still do not 
have the rules of engagement in place. The effort to create fa-
cilities-based competition over incumbent local phone net-
works has been strangled by a tangle of FCC rulings and court 
decisions. The legal decisions have turned on a complicated 
series of empirical judgments about competition, about the ex-
tent to which entrants can build their own facilities—self-
provision in the standard lingo—or obtain access from third 
parties or from the incumbent voluntarily. At the same time, 
facilities-based competition has emerged in the form of cable 
telephony and voice-over-IP, with broadband over powerlines, 
                                                  
14 Separate Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell Dissenting in Part, February 
20, 2003 (available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
231344A3.pdf).  
15 Id. (“The Majority apparently is a big fan of UNE-P, because it has contorted the 
letter and spirit of the statute and the court’s interpretation of our responsibilities in 
an effort to ensure its indefinite preservation. … Consistently underlying my prefer-
ence in this area is a commitment to promote and advance facilities-based competi-
tion that is meaningful and sustainable, and that will eventually achieve Congress’ 
stated goal of reducing regulation.”) 
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and, more dramatically, with the explosion in cell phone use.16 
Mandated sharing meets fierce resistance, while entrants with 
their own facilities are eager to compete. 
In this paper, I want to consider the intersection of three 
partially-linked issues: entry, access and facilities-based compe-
tition. In understanding the way in which these three ideas in-
terrelate, we need to focus on how the ability to enter by build-
ing a facility influences the willingness of an incumbent to sell 
access to the incumbent’s preexisting facility. The threat of fa-
cilities-based entry may induce the incumbent to voluntarily 
create shared-facilities competition or pure resale competition. 
Put slightly differently, an incumbent faced with the prospect 
of facilities-based entry may choose to enter wholesaling volun-
tarily. 
To try to get traction on this, I play through a series of 
simple models. I start with the most basic situation: one prod-
uct and one natural monopoly technology with many possible 
competitors. Think of this perhaps as local telephone service 
without long-distance or now local telephone service without 
DSL. In this setting, we do not want facilities-based competi-
tion and should not expect to see it. If the required investment 
in facilities by an entrant to enter on its own would deter entry, 
the entrant won’t come in and the incumbent will not cut a 
deal with the entrant to give access to the rival voluntarily and 
we will have monopoly. If an incumbent faces a real threat of 
entry—meaning that it would be profitable for an entrant to 
build its own facility and compete with the incumbent—the 
                                                  
16 For background on these developments, see Petition for Declaratory Ruling that 
pulver.com’s Free World Dialup in Neither Telecommunications Nor a Telecom-
munications Service, FCC 04-27 (Feb. 19, 2004); Carrier Current Systems, includ-
ing Broadband over Power Line Systems, FCC 04-29 (Feb. 23, 2004). 
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incumbent would do better to cut a deal with the entrant and 
share its facility with the entrant. 
In this simple framework, the second facility adds nothing, 
and the incumbent and entrant should split the gains from 
avoiding the wasted expenditures on a new facility. In either 
case—whether there is a threat of entry or not—we should not 
want facilities-based competition and we should not expect to 
see it. Law matters in this setting in the way that it can alter 
the possibility of the threat of entry. If underlying state law ef-
fectively makes any threat of facilities-based entry incredible, 
the incumbent will decline to give the entrant access to its facil-
ity. The 1996 Act preempts state laws barring entry and in that 
way restores any meaningful threat of facilities-based entry,17 
but, for the reasons just given, that alone won’t induce facili-
ties-based competition. 
Facilities-based competition plays no role with one product 
and one natural monopoly technology. In defending facilities-
based competition, the FCC has emphasized three ideas. First, 
facilities-based competition will allow the FCC to reduce regu-
lation of telcom markets. Second, facilities-based competition 
will create valuable redundancy in the telcom network. Third, 
facilities-based competition promises greater product differen-
tiation. As I think that it is difficult to get analytic traction on 
the first two ideas, I spend very little time on them here. In-
stead, I consider the question of the relationship between 
product differentiation and facilities-based competition. 
The reality is that the link between facilities-based compe-
tition and new products is far from obvious. Walk down the 
cereal aisle at your local grocery store and assess the seemingly 
                                                  
17 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (“No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or 
local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of 
any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.”) 
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infinite variety of choices available for your breakfast. Yet the 
cereal market is quite concentrated, and so a handful of com-
panies create all of this variety. And they do that from a small 
number of facilities. Kellogg’s operates five plants in the US 
and Canada. The trick, of course, is that firms routinely pro-
duce many products from a single plant. Indeed, part of the art 
of managing a plant is precisely in figuring out how to config-
ure production runs given the variety of products that the plant 
produces.18 
To try to assess this, I take two steps away from the simple 
model of one product/one natural monopoly facility model de-
scribed above. The first step is one facility with two products, 
the next step a two-piece facility with two products. In consid-
ering the relationship between new products and facilities, we 
face a basic question. Can we make the new products using the 
existing facilities or do we need new facilities to create new 
products? If we can build new products from old facilities, we 
shouldn’t need facilities-based competition to get the new 
products. Again, if the entrant has a credible threat of facilities-
based entry, we should expect the incumbent to cut a deal with 
the entrant to create access to the incumbent’s facility to build 
the new product. If there is no credible threat of entry, the in-
cumbent won’t give access voluntarily and a rule of mandatory 
access would result in the production of the new product by the 
entrant. We would not get facilities-based competition that 
way, but again, by hypothesis we shouldn’t want facilities-based 
competition here anyhow. 
If instead we need a new facility, in whole or in part, to cre-
ate the new product, the analysis follows another path. If the 
new product market can support the building of the new facil-
                                                  
18 Info on Kellogg taken from Gerald Brown et al, The Kellogg Company Opti-
mizes Production, Inventory and Distribution, 31 Interfaces 1 (Nov.-Dec. 2001). 
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ity by the entrant on a standalone basis, we should expect that 
facility to be built. If not, then we should not expect to see fa-
cilities-based entry. Why? If the new facility only makes eco-
nomic sense for an entrant if it provides both the old product 
and the new product from the new facility, the incumbent and 
entrant will cut a deal in which the entrant uses the incum-
bent’s facility to make only the old product. The regulator 
could induce facilities-based competition by barring a deal be-
tween the incumbent and the entrant, and then the entrant 
might enter, and in some cases, might be socially justified. But, 
either way, mandatory access isn’t needed and indeed, the real 
problem may be too much access, not too little. 
In the one facility, multiple products context the relation-
ship between facilities-based competition and mandatory access 
is probably tightest in a where either the incumbent or the en-
trant (or both) might build the new facility to create the new 
product. In that setting, “incumbent” and “entrant” are less 
meaningful designations, though there is little doubt that the 
incumbent continues to have an advantage in the new facility 
involves weaving together parts of the incumbent’s old facility 
with the new facilities. If we impose mandatory access and 
make it asymmetric, we may alter results and change the extent 
to which we see facilities-based competition. If the entrant can 
access the incumbent’s facility—but not vice versa—the entrant 
will have a natural incentive to hang back to see if the new 
product succeeds. Of course, the incumbent might be discour-
aged from investing in the first place if it knows that it will 
have to share only successful new facilities. 
But if we take one more step, we can probably find a better 
link between access and facilities-based entry. So consider the 
idea of the two-piece facility producing two products. Think of 
the pieces as the local network and a long-distance transmis-
sion facility and the two products as local calling and long-
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press10    April 28, 2004 
 
distance calling. We know that framing matches roughly the 
history of long-distance entry. We had a single integrated 
phone system, with local and long-distance pieces and we 
eventually see MCI build microwave towers to transmit phone 
calls between St. Louis and Chicago. If MCI had been forced 
to build the entire network, it almost certainly could not have 
entered the market. Certainly then, the local network was seen 
as a natural monopoly. It clearly would have been inefficient to 
build a second local network—that just says again that the local 
network was a natural monopoly—and it was also probably the 
case that it was a money-losing proposition for MCI to build a 
local network. 
Bundling entry—forcing MCI to enter on the scale of hav-
ing to build a local network if it wanted to enter the long-
distance business—would probably have prevented the long-
distance entry. Unbundling entry—giving MCI access to the 
local network while allowing entry only in long-distance (and 
only one route at that)—meant that MCI could just compare 
the much more limited capital costs of building the second 
piece with the profits associated with that piece rather than the 
costs of both pieces with the profits associated with both 
pieces. 
That is not to say, though, that unbundling the pieces will 
necessarily create facilities-based entry. It may or may not. 
With access by law to the local network, MCI could then 
credibly threaten entry in long-distance facilities. That might 
have resulted in AT&T giving voluntary access to its long-
distance facilities even it would have never offered voluntary 
access to both pieces of the network. Whether we should ex-
pect voluntary access to the long-distance facility conditional 
on legal access to the local facility depends on a number of fac-
tors, including whether we think long-distance transmission 
has a natural monopoly cost structure. If not, we might very 
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well create facilities-based entry in long-distance by creating 
legal access to the local phone network. 
And now we get to the key point: unbundling in this way 
means that the entrant makes the choice as to whether facili-
ties-based entry is sensible. This is critical. In the restaurant 
example above, if there is a Chinese restaurant in my town and 
I am considering whether to set up a competing Italian restau-
rant, I make the choice. I get to bear the risk of whether the 
market really can support two restaurants. We do not require 
that the potential entrant ask the government to agree that a 
second restaurant should be built. Yet the analysis of the D.C. 
Circuit in USTA I does exactly that, to some extent with regard 
to the general sharing rules but particularly so with regard to 
Line Sharing Order and its separate unbundling of the high-
frequency part of the local loop. In doing so, the D.C. Circuit 
gave insufficient weight to the consequences of the FCC’s line-
sharing rule for vesting in the entrant the power to choose 
whether or not to enter. 
USTA II makes a different mistake in focusing on voluntary 
provision of access by incumbents. As already noted, the threat 
of entry will induce the incumbent to offer access voluntarily to 
its network. The threat of forced access at low prices will ac-
complish the same result, if “voluntary” access at higher prices 
staves off the forced, low-price access. Under the framework 
announced in USTA II, incumbents will have every incentive to 
set voluntary access prices to network elements at prices that 
fully extract anticipated profits by the entrant—minus a hair or 
so—and thereby avoid having to give access to those elements 
at TELRIC prices. This will largely end the TELRIC regime 
and will severely discourage entry or will put the FCC and state 
commissions in the midst of a messy, hard-to-administer pric-
ing quagmire. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section I looks at two ex-
amples of mixed competition—resale and facilities-based com-
petition—prior to the 1996 Act. Section II considers the single 
product model and quickly works through three variations. The 
key idea there is that we should not want facilities-based com-
petition and should not expect to see it arise. Section III turns 
to the question of multiple products and plays through the two 
variations discussed above. Section IV concludes the paper by 
applying the analysis of Sections II and III to two key issues 
addressed in USTA I, USTA II and the revised sets of rules, 
namely, in assessing unbundling obligations to what extent 
should we consider (1) intermodal competition—competition 
from cable and other sources; and (2) voluntary provisioning by 
incumbents. 
I. Two Examples of Mixed Competition before the 1996 Act 
Given the recent focus on facilities-based competition, it is a 
useful exercise to look at prior examples of mixed facilities and 
non-facilities based competition in telecommunications. Two 
examples, long distance and early wireless, are worth consider-
ing. 
A. Long-Distance Competition 
The quick history of competition in long distance phone ser-
vice is worth retelling.19 The development of competition in 
long distance almost certainly served as the mental model that 
led to the structure of the unbundling provisions applied to lo-
cal telecommunications in the 1996 Act. Two strands of that 
                                                  
19 For background, see Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Market, 5 
F.C.C. Rec. 2627 (1990). 
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history—facilities-based competition and resale competition—
weave together. 
On July 29, 1959, the FCC adopted a key ruling enabling 
private microwave communications.20 The FCC had not re-
considered since World War II how the relevant chunk of the 
spectrum should be used. The technology had changed consid-
erably in that time. Bell Laboratories had started laboratory 
testing of microwave communications in 1946 and sought 
FCC permission for field tests in 1947.21 By 1951, the Bell 
System was using its TD2 microwave relay system to ship net-
work television signals from coast-to-coast.22 By 1957, the Bell 
System had put in place a nationwide network of microwave 
stations23 and microwave transmission quickly became the 
dominant way of transmitting long-distance telecommunica-
tions.24 Microwave was, in many ways, superior to the coaxial 
cable that the Bell system had previously relied on for the bulk 
of its long-distance communications.25 
And entry was much easier for microwave, at least if the 
FCC would play ball. Laying or stringing coaxial cable involved 
high potentially high coordination costs, as you needed a con-
nected path. You might have done that along preexisting 
paths—such as railroads or on telegraph poles, the solution 
found when fiber optics came on the scene—but the microwave 
was better technology with very low coordination costs for en-
                                                  
20 Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 FCC 359 (1959). 
21 See A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell System, Transmission 
Technology (1925-1975) (E.F. O’Neill, Editor, 1985), p. 291.  
22 Id. at 296. 
23 Id. at 729. 
24 Id. at 784-85. 
25 Id. at 729, 784-85. 
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try. Isolated towers had to be built and the microwaves them-
selves which make the connections through the air. 
In its 1959 investigation, the FCC faced two key policy is-
sues, the first a largely technical issue on the supply of micro-
wave frequencies and the manner in which they might be used, 
and the second, on the economic effects that licensing private 
point-to-point microwave systems would have on common car-
riers and the general public.26 The second issue subsumed a se-
ries of related issues all too familiar to modern ears. The exist-
ing common carriers favored incorporating microwave systems 
into the then-extent public system, as indeed had already taken 
place: no need for separate private systems. In contrast, the pri-
vate firms saw tangible benefits from direct control over private 
systems, including the ability to establish priorities for repair 
and maintenance. Moreover, a separate private system could 
operate as a redundant “fallback” system in the case of a na-
tional emergency.27 
The common carriers feared “cream skimming,” with a re-
duction of revenues and an inability to maintain services for 
users who remained in the public system. Those concerns 
would be exacerbated were the Commission to allow private 
users to band together to share microwave facilities.28 The Bell 
system argued against some form of mandatory interconnection 
between the common carrier system and the proposed private 
microwave system.29 In adopting a ruling that made possible 
licensing of private point-to-point microwave systems (but not 
sharing of those systems), the Commission saw little support 
                                                  
26 Allocation, supra note xx, at 404. 
27 Id. at 379. 
28 Id. at 387. 
29 Id. at 396-97. 
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for AT&T’s claims that substantial revenues would be diverted 
from the Bell system. 
Even though it clearly would take time to build out micro-
wave systems and to secure approvals from the FCC for build-
ing individual systems, the competitive response from AT&T 
was almost immediate. The FCC’s 1959 ruling made entry 
credible, and as we would expect, in the face of credible entry, 
the Bell system moved towards better voluntary access to its 
facilities. In January, 1961, AT&T filed a new service tariff 
with the FCC creating its “Telpak” service.30 At that time, only 
one private microwave system was in operation. Telpak offered 
volume discounts for customers who needed high-volume con-
nections between specified points. It competed directly with 
the private-lines service offered before by AT&T and did so at 
a substantial price discount. The table that follows shows 
monthly rates for different levels of service: 
 
Service Volume  Individ. Priv. Lines  Telpak 
A  12 Voice Grade Channels  $3,780  $1,860 
B  24 Voice Grade Channels  $7,560  $2,720 
C  60 Voice Grade Channels  $18,900  $4,300 
D  240 Voice Grade Channels  $75,600  $11,700 
 
Two points jump out. First, Telpak was substantially less 
expensive than the prior private lines offering, even though the 
service itself was typically provided over precisely the same 
wires used in the private service.31 Second, private lines were 
priced linearly: twice as many lines cost twice as much, ten 
                                                  
30 This discussion follows the factual description in American Trucking Associa-
tions, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 377 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 
1965). 
31 See American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 449 F.2d 439, 446 n.5 (2d 
Cir. 1971) 
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times as many lines, ten times as much. In contrast, Telpak 
prices declined proportionately as voice grade channels were 
added. That creates an obvious incentive for customers to 
group together to share lines to take advantage of the better 
prices available at higher volumes. That incentive was raised 
when the FCC found the Telpak A and B package prices to be 
discriminatory vis-à-vis private-line tariffs, so only the Telpak 
C and D package prices survived.32 
Given the volume discounts built into the Telpak rates, 
customers would naturally want to share packages and inter-
mediary resellers might have jumped in to facilitate that shar-
ing. Unsurprisingly, this point was not lost on AT&T and the 
filed tariff limited sharing only to those groups who had paral-
lel sharing rights for private microwave systems under the 
FCC’s 1959 microwave order.33 That led to a scuffle, ulti-
mately resolved in 1971, over the permitted scope of sharing of 
Telpak service, with the FCC finding that the limited sharing 
was discriminatory and with the discrimination to be resolved 
by permitting unlimited sharing, with the Second Circuit find-
ing that conclusion insufficiently justified, and with the prob-
lem of discrimination “solved” on the remand to the FCC by 
eliminating all sharing.34 
The Telpak offering history is instructive. When AT&T 
did not face an entry threat, it charged high prices for private 
line services. The FCC’s 1959 microwave ruling created the 
possibility of facilities-based entry. It is far from obvious that a 
new facility was needed or that it would be better to have it 
                                                  
32 See American Trucking Ass’n, 377 F.2d at 129; AT&T, 449 F.2d at 443. 
33 See AT&T, 449 F.2d at 433. 
34 See AT&T, 449 F.2d at 450-53; Telpak Tariff Sharing Provisions of American 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. and The Western Union Telegraph Co., 32 
F.C.C.2d 619 (1971). 
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owned separately from the public phone system. After all, the 
Bell system had developed microwave transmission and had 
already incorporated it extensively into the public network. The 
Telpak offering created voluntary access at prices that reflect 
the opportunities available to customers through microwave 
entry. 
Meanwhile, facilities-based entry through the microwave 
systems moved ahead slowly. In a hotly-contested ruling, in 
1969, the FCC approved the application of Microwave Com-
munications, Inc.—MCI as we now know them—to construct 
an 11-hop point-to-point private microwave system between 
Chicago and St. Louis.35 MCI promised lower prices and more 
flexible service, key factors leading to the Commission’s ap-
proval. The 4-3 FCC majority acknowledged that MCI had 
put no new technology on the table, that it was just offering 
somewhat differently-configured services at lower prices.36 The 
majority rejected the view that MCI’s limited entry could 
somehow pose “any serious threat” to cost-averaging. Only a 
nationwide entrant might be able to enter with the same cost-
averaging possibilities, and the majority understood that entry 
of that sort was highly unlikely.37 The dissenters at the FCC 
feared that the needs of the general public were being sacrificed 
to benefit the needs of a small group of private lines custom-
ers—204 such customers to be precise—and that this “typical 
‘cream-skimming operation” would destroy the system of pric-
ing nationwide based on average costs.38 The dissenters also 
noted that the available information suggested that AT&T 
                                                  
35 Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969). 
36 Id. at 959-60. 
37 Id. at 961. 
38 Id. at 972 (dissenting statement of Chairmen Hyde). 
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could set private line prices below what MCI planned and still 
cover its costs. 
The approval of MCI’s private microwave system between 
Chicago and St. Louis set loose a torrent of applications to the 
FCC. When the FCC issued in March, 1971 a notice of gen-
eral rulemaking for these specialized common carrier services, it 
had 1713 pending applications for microwave stations. By June, 
1971, when it issued its ruling, the number had grown to 
1877.39 The FCC’s decision in MCI set the stage for a broad 
embrace of competition in specialized common carrier services. 
The growing role of data communications—as opposed to tra-
ditional voice communications—suggested that communica-
tions market was expanding and that new competitors would 
not just be pursuing customers already served by the public 
phone network. By limiting the new services to those akin to 
the private-line services already provided by the public net-
work, the incursion, if any, of the entrants into existing markets 
would naturally be limited.40 
Or so at least the Commission thought. MCI quickly 
sought to move forward beyond private-line services towards a 
public long-distance service. In September, 1974, MCI filed a 
new tariff with the FCC which called for the creation of a new 
service, labeled Execunet. Under that service, any individual 
could dial a local telephone number in a market served by MCI 
to in turn make a long distance phone call to a second market 
served by MCI.41 The Execunet service represented a major 
                                                  
39 Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 871 n.1 (1971). 
40 For additional discussion, see Glen O. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: 
AT&T and the Changing World of Telecommunications, 5 Yale J Reg 517, 523-24 
(1988). 
41 See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 367 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). 
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change in the use of MCI’s facilities and created the possibility 
of meaningful long-distance competition. The FCC rejected 
the new service, arguing that it went beyond the limited au-
thorization given the MCI when the FCC approved MCI’s 
construction of its microwave facilities. But the D.C. Circuit 
interpreted the relevant statutes otherwise42 and ordered man-
datory interconnection by AT&T when AT&T sought to un-
dercut the D.C. Circuit’s original ruling in favor of MCI.43 
As has been noted elsewhere,44 the development of compe-
tition in long distance is in many ways the cleanest example of 
an important trend in modern network industries, namely, the 
unbundling of the network, so as to allow competition in some 
segments while continuing monopoly in other segments. In the 
long distance history, we see facilities-based entry creating sub-
stantial competition in one segment—long distance—while the 
local phone monopolies continued. 
While facilities-based competition was breaking out in 
long-distance, the FCC continued to deal with the issues of 
resale competition addressed in the Telpak sharing proceed-
ings. In 1976, the Commission adopted a policy permitting 
resale of private line services.45 At the same time, the Commis-
sion rejected a parallel policy for resale of bulk public commu-
nications services. Common carriers such as AT&T had re-
                                                  
42 Id. at 375-76, 379-80. 
43 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 
1978). For greater detail on this history, see Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Po-
litical Economy of Telecommunications Reform, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 835, 845-46 
(1997). 
44 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of 
Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1342 (1998). 
45 Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Ser-
vices and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976), upheld in AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 
(1978). 
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stricted through contract and tariff resale of their private line 
services. 
In examining these issues, the Commission distinguished 
two key activities, brokerage and processing. A broker would 
operate as a pure intermediary, a firm that might, in the Com-
mission’s example, buy Telpak service in bulk and break it 
down for smaller customers.46 The basic telecommunications 
service provided remains unchanged through the role of the 
broker. In contrast, a processor or value-added intermediary 
might meld the underlying telecommunications service with 
additional services, such as those relating to data processing or 
facsimile transmission. 
Unsurprisingly given the Commission’s effort to mandate 
sharing in its Telpak proceedings, the FCC eliminated all shar-
ing and resale restrictions imposed by common carriers on their 
private line services. The FCC believed that resale arbitrage 
would push common carriers to price their offerings in a way 
more closely aligned with costs.47 The Commission also saw 
the existing private-line pricing as reflecting substantial undue 
discrimination and believed that resale arbitrage would mini-
mize that discrimination. Moreover, the Commission antici-
pated substantial free entry by bulk resellers.48 
The Commission declined to eliminate sharing restrictions 
on public—non private line—services, in particular the basic 
message telephone service (“MTS”) and  and the Wide Area 
Telecommunications Service (“WATS”).49 But that decision 
lasted only four years. By that time, the FCC had undertaken a 
                                                  
46 Id. at 272. 
47 Id. at 298. 
48 Id. at 310. 
49 Id. at 321. 
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broad inquiry into the appropriate market structure for long-
distance services.50 The Commission considered but rejected 
the possibility that the facilities of the entrants could be inte-
grated into the preexisting public network system.51 The 
Commission saw no evidence proving that substantial econo-
mies of scale would be lost through having separate facilities.52 
The Commission also believed that competitive entry would 
not probably lead to substantial “de-averaging” of long-distance 
rates.53 
The Commission believed that competition would create 
the usual benefits: provision of service at the lowest possible 
cost; elimination of waste; better and more responsive service 
for customers; and greater innovation.54 Indeed, the Commis-
sion saw its long-distance market structure inquiry as the al-
most final step in transitioning to a competitive market in long 
distance. A key additional step was to reverse its prior sharing 
decision on MTS and WATS by eliminating restrictions im-
posed by common carriers that prevented customers from shar-
ing those services.55 The Commission saw the benefits of broad 
sharing of these services as reduced rates for small customers; 
better use of communications capacity; and greater innovation 
through reseller packaging of services.56 The standard com-
                                                  
50 MTS and WATS Market Structure, 81 F.C.C.2d 177 (1980). 
51 Id. at 183. 
52 Id. at 184. 
53 Id. at 192. 
54 Id. at 202. 
55 Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier 
Domestic Public Switched Services, 83 F.C.C.2d 167 (1980). 
56 Id. at 172. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press22    April 28, 2004 
 
plaint by AT&T that resale would require it to reconsider its 
basic rates for service would be dealt with another day.57 
B. Wireless Competition 
As the entity most directly charged with managing spectrum, 
the FCC has been intimately involved in the design of the 
wireless phone market. For technical reasons, the FCC initially 
contemplated that there would be a single cell phone system in 
each market.58 The FCC also had decided to limit cell phone 
licenses to wireline carriers.59 Obviously, as the FCC surely un-
derstood, both of these choices would have minimized compe-
tition. The wireline carrier wouldn’t use the wireless system to 
compete with itself, and we would clearly get more competition 
with more cell phone licensees. 
As technology evolved and the FCC reconsidered its initial 
decision, the FCC moved to a two-license plan so as to “af-
ford[] the public the benefits of some facilities-based competi-
tion.”60 The FCC also put up for reconsideration the eligibility 
of wireline carriers for the cell phone licenses. Although the 
Commission understood the possible ways in which a wireline 
carrier might hobble cell phone service, the Commission con-
cluded that one cell phone license in each area should be re-
served for wireline carriers.61 
The FCC saw a trade-off from wireline carrier participa-
tion: greater knowledge and resources than an entrant would 
have but a possible concern that cell phone service would com-
                                                  
57 Id. at 182. 
58 An Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for 
Cellular Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 471 (1981). 
59 Id. at 472. 
60 Id. at 476. 
61 Id. at 483. 
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pete with the wireline carrier’s existing services. The FCC ul-
timately came down in favor of the wireline carriers because the 
FCC believed that it was unlikely that under any circumstances 
cell phone service would emerge as a direct competitor to local 
wireline service: 
Most commenters believe that cellular sys-
tems will initially only be competitive in the 
traditional 2-way mobile market. Our own 
evaluation is in agreement with this posi-
tion. The key to local exchange substitut-
ability in any practical sense is the availabil-
ity of an inexpensive handheld portable unit 
that is light in weight. Until such an inex-
pensive unit is available, cellular service can-
not realistically service as a meaningful re-
placement for local wireline service. We do 
not foresee the widespread availability of 
such inexpensive units for some time.62 
Based on this view, the FCC opted in favor of reserving a cell 
phone license in each market for a wireline carrier. At this 
time—1981—this really meant reserving a license for AT&T. 
The first cell phone round thus created some facilities-
based competition but less than could have been achieved. The 
FCC also focused on resale competition. Although the FCC 
frankly acknowledged that it was quite uncertain that “true re-
sale of cellular service [would] develop,”63 it extended its policy 
in long-distance markets favoring resale to the new cell phone 
market. Thus, the spectrum licenses to be granted would bar 
licensees from imposing restrictions on resale. 
                                                  
62 Id. at 484 (footnotes omitted). 
63 Id. at 511. 
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We know that wireless service has changed dramatically, 
but so have the resale rules for wireless. Wireless service has 
expanded quickly as the FCC has allocated additional spectrum 
for personal communications services.64 This has been a process 
with the usual bumps and bruises—not all of the purchasers 
buying at the spectrum auctions ordered by Congress could pay 
and that has generated litigation, uncertainty and idle spec-
trum65—but ultimately the rapid expansion in cell phone us-
age—mobile wireless telephone subscribers have jumped from 
roughly 79.7 million in December 1999 to 128.8 million in 
June 200266—tells us that much has gone right. 
As to the wireless resale market, available figures suggest 
that as of March 1996, there were about 750,000 subscribers 
receiving cell phone services through resellers, or roughly 2% of 
all cell phone users.67 By the end of 2000, roughly 3 million 
subscribers were receiving services through resale68 against 
about 101 million overall subscribers69, or slightly under 3% of 
                                                  
64 For general discussion, see Peter W. Huber, Michael K. Kellogg & John Thorne, 
Federal Communications Law § 10.4.3 (2
nd ed. 1999). 
65 See FCC v. Nextwave Personal Communications, Inc., ___ U.S. ___ (Jan. 27, 
2003). 
66 See FCC, Industry Analysis Division, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of 
June 30, 2002 at Table 11 (2002) (available online at 
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-
State_Link/IAD/lcom1202.pdf>). 
67 These are crude numbers. An RCR publication of March 11, 1996 reports data 
on the top 20 cellular resellers, ranging from MCI at 375,000 customers to Robin 
Hood Telecommunications at 2,100. The total for the top 20 is 747,994. At the 
same time, the FCC reports 33,785,661 cell subscribers as of December, 1995 and 
44,042,992 as of December, 1996. The 2% figure uses the December 1995 figure 
and thus overstates the actual percentage, assuming, with probably little reason to do 
so, that the March, 1996 figures are really for that date and not some earlier date. 
68 RCR Wireless News, Jan. 8, 2001, p.18. 
69 FCC Local Competition Data, Table 11. 
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the total. All of this suggests that wireless resale has not been 
important to date. And, it is far from clear how much resale is 
due to mandatory access and how much would have occurred 
voluntarily. The recent development of the mobile virtual net-
work operator—wireless infrastructure married with an other-
wise prominent brand, such as Virgin Mobile in perhaps the 
best-known case to date—suggests that much resale would oc-
cur on its own without mandatory access.70 
That is good news, since mandatory wireless resale is going 
away. Prior to the rise of PCS wireless, the FCC made some 
fine adjustments in the wireless resale rules. Some issues had 
arisen about the extent to which one facilities-based wireless 
carrier had to allow resale by the second facilities-based wireless 
carrier, and whether allowing resale in that circumstance re-
duced the incentive of the carrier to complete build out of its 
network. The typical pattern was purchase by the second en-
trant from the already-established wireline carrier holding the 
first cell license in an area. The FCC ultimately concluded that 
while it was helpful to allow resale during the five-year build 
out period for the entrant, after that, mandatory resale should 
stop, a stick as it were to complete building the network.71 
With the creation of PCS wireless, the Commission again 
needed to decide the extent to which restrictions on resale 
should be limited. Although the Commission believed that it 
should extend its resale policy to the new PCS services, it also 
believed that once those services were up and running, there 
                                                  
70 See Ben Charny, “Virgin Mobile off to good start,” C|net News.com, February 5, 
2003 (http://news.com.com/2100-1033-983517.html); Deborah Mendez-Wilson, 
Calling On the Youth Market, Wireless Week, July 2, 2001.  
71 Petitions for Rule Making Concerning Proposed Changes to the Commission’s 
Cellular Resale Policies, 7 FCC Rcd 4006, 4010 (1992). 
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would be sufficient competition in the wireless market to allow 
sunseting of the wireless resale rules.72 
C. Evaluating Resale Competition 
Stop and consider whether we should welcome resale competi-
tion in the forms seen in long distance and wireless. In both 
cases, we need to assess how rates are set in the final product 
market. In the case of long distance, competition broke out at 
the period of maximal control by regulators over rates faced by 
users. In that context, if the regulators are doing a good job, 
entry just creates problems, it doesn’t solve them. 
If we start with a regulated monopolist offering services to 
different customers, the regulator will need to set prices for 
each group of customers. The standard response in theory is 
Ramsey pricing. The regulator sets a series of prices—prices for 
long distance and for local service, for business customers and 
consumers, for urban and rural users—to minimize social loss 
while hitting a revenue target. The revenue target will be de-
termined through a political process, but think of it as solvency 
plus some sort of return to shareholders. As to minimizing so-
cial loss, the key point is that we would like prices to be as close 
to marginal cost as possible, since that induces the right 
amount of consumption. No one buys when he or she values 
the service at less than cost, but no one is discouraged from 
buying by prices substantially in excess of costs. 
Of course, if prices are just set to recover marginal costs, 
the fixed costs of creating the network aren’t covered, and the 
regulated firm loses money. The Ramsey approach is about al-
locating the fixed costs of production among the different 
                                                  
72 Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Phone 
Services, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 18455, 18456-57 (1996), upheld in Cellnet Communica-
tions, Inc. v. FCC, 149 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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groups using the service. The theory says that inelastic deman-
ders should pay a larger share of the fixed costs. Inelastic de-
manders won’t change their purchases much in the face of 
higher charges, and it is the reduced consumption when we 
push prices above marginal cost that causes the social loss. So 
elastic demanders should not bear too many fixed costs, inelas-
tic demanders should pay a big chunk of those costs. 
Now assume that we have put Ramsey prices into place. 
Those prices will create arbitrage opportunities: indeed, the 
whole vision behind Ramsey pricing is that we dump fixed 
costs on inelastic demanders, while elastic demanders bear few 
of those costs. Ramsey pricing is precisely about price discrimi-
nation. If a resale entrant jumps in to arbitrage between high-
price and low-price customers, the Ramsey prices will not be 
sustainable. In the extreme, all customers get access to the low 
price and we are back to having a one-price system, and one in 
which the incumbent seller is not covering its costs. 
Put differently, arbitrage-driven entry makes it quite hard 
to sustain price discrimination of the sort required in the Ram-
sey scheme. If we allow resale, we are forced back to a one-
price system, with the price set to ensure the incumbent’s sol-
vency, and we are necessarily worse off than we would have 
been had we barred the entry. If the regulators got the prices 
right in the first instance, entry that emerges because of regula-
tor-created price gaps and that ends those gaps is entry we do 
not want. This is clearly the core “cream skimming” idea 
AT&T feared from long-distance entry. 
The regulators may not have implemented Ramsey prices 
in the first instance, but they clearly had created an elaborate 
pattern of cross-subsidies, and that pattern would become more 
difficult to sustain after entry. The move from Ramsey prices to 
cross-subsidy prices just generalizes the Ramsey point, as Ram-
sey pricing is just in some sense an “optimal” cross-subsidy 
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scheme. How should we evaluate entry, whether facilities-
based competition or otherwise, where the entry opportunity is 
created by cross-subsidy driven pricing? To some extent, this 
requires a political account—a public choice account—about 
the nature of subsidies. If we thought that the subsidies were 
appropriate, then we should bar entry occurring just because of 
the opportunity created by the cross subsidy. So if the incum-
bent charges a higher price in urban areas than costs would 
warrant but does so because of a requirement that the price 
structure force urban users to subsidize rural users, entry tar-
geted at urban users should be seen as problematic. 
In contrast, if we think of cross-subsidies as emerging 
through efforts to capture regulators, entry may be useful in 
that it may make those subsidies unsustainable. Obviously, all 
of that is much more complex than just described. If winners in 
the regulatory capture game get cross-subsidies, as a first cut, 
we should expect them to win the entry regulation game as 
well. The wireless case seems to present a different situation. 
As I will develop in the next section, we may use resale compe-
tition to shift out of regulation in the final price market to 
regulation in the input market. Resale wireless competition 
may fit that model. 
II. Negotiated Access and Facilities-Based Competition 
A. Creating an Industry 
It is almost useful to consider an Economics 101 view of per-
fectly competitive markets. We have a single good produced in 
the industry and perhaps a single technology to produce it. By 
construction, really, competition isn’t about the nature of the 
good—we only have one—or how to best produce it—we only 
have one technology—but over price. In equilibrium, we 
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should expect firms to earn zero economic profits. Competition 
between firms generates this equilibrium and pushes prices to 
average costs, as when price equals average cost, firms break-
even. 
In this stylized framework, what can we say about facilities-
based competition? To see that in a simple setting, suppose 
that the production technology has a natural monopoly cost 
structure, say a fixed cost of entering production, and a fixed 
marginal cost of production for every level of production. We 
should note what this means immediately. We really don’t 
want facilities-based competition here, unless we desire it for 
instrumental reasons because we think that it will improve 
competition and push down prices. The extra expenditure of 
fixed costs doesn’t create additional useful productive capacity: 
the incumbent can already produce any amount the market de-
sires at the lowest possible cost. 
Consider an entrant facing the incumbent. The entrant 
might very well want to enter a contract with the incumbent to 
“outsource” production, so that the incumbent would produce 
whatever amount the entrant needed. The entrant and the in-
cumbent might compete to locate customers or on customer 
responsiveness to complaints, etc., but both the incumbent and 
the entrant would draw on the same goods to deliver to their 
customers. 
Why would the incumbent agree to this deal, which just 
creates a competitor? The answer is straightforward: if the en-
trant would enter anyhow, the incumbent does better by strik-
ing a deal through which it can capture some of the fixed costs 
shared by avoiding actual facilities-based entry by the entrant. I 
will make all of that more precise below, but it captures the key 
idea. 
I should be more precise. Consider the formation of this 
industry. Any potential entrant i to the industry has access to 
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the production technology which allows production given by 
Ki + c*qi. This is a “natural monopoly” cost function and I will 
say more about it below. Think of entry and production as a 
four-step process (a four-stage game if you will). At stage 1, 
firm 1 chooses whether to build a facility at a price of K1. At 
stage 2, firm 1 announces an access policy to the facility that 
consists of a fixed number of access licenses, a per license fee 
and a per-unit fee for production. In some ways, think of this 
as an outsourcing offer, where the first firm is offering to pro-
duce goods that the entrants can sell. The first firm—the in-
cumbent by the time we have reached stage 2—might choose 
to give access to no one. Alternatively, the incumbent might 
choose to license access to some entrants, perhaps at a lump-
sum access price plus a per-unit price set equal to the marginal 
cost c. Still alternatively, the incumbent might set a per-unit 
price at some mark-up of marginal cost and charge yet another 
lump-sum access price. Once the incumbent has announced its 
offer in stage 2, entrants can choose to accept it or not, but de-
pending on the offer, some entrants might want to accept but 
be turned down. For example, the incumbent might announce 
that it will produce for only one other firm. 
At stage 3, potential entrants who have not struck a deal 
with the incumbent can decide whether or not to enter. Those 
that want to enter will spend Ki to build a facility and then can 
produce an unlimited number of units at the fixed marginal 
cost of c. Finally, at stage 4, all firms in the industry play a 
Cournot quantity game to determine the quantities produced. 
We can do a bunch of math, but on this simple formula-
tion, I think one thing should be clear: it is never in the incum-
bent’s interest to see uncontrolled entry—unlicensed entry or 
facilities-based entry—at stage 3. Put differently, if an unli-
censed firm would enter at stage 3 by building a facility, given 
what has happened at stages 1 and 2 and given what is antici-
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pated will happen at stage 4, the incumbent should have issued 
one more license during the second stage. 
Why? The analysis should work this way. The Cournot 
game that is played in stage 4 is wholly independent of what-
ever fixed amounts any firm has spent to build facilities in stage 
3 (or for the incumbent in stage 1) or to buy access to the in-
cumbent’s facilities in stage 2. These costs are sunk at stage 4. 
They matter for entry decisions and the number of firms in the 
industry—more on that in a second—but do not matter for 
production decisions once we know who is in the industry. The 
Nash equilibrium in the Cournot game is driven by the number 
of firms in the industry and the marginal costs they face for 
gaining access to a unit of production. That may be the actual 
marginal cost of production, c, as it will be for the incumbent 
and any unlicensed entrants who have built their own facilities. 
For licensed firms, the marginal costs they face will be deter-
mined by the royalty rate set by the incumbent, which may or 
may not be the marginal cost of production c. But in any case, 
it is just the marginal access costs and the number of firms that 
give rise to the equilibrium. 
Given the production function, from the incumbent’s per-
spective, an unlicensed stage 3 entrant is just a wasted opportu-
nity. Given the assumed production technology, the incumbent 
can produce an unlimited amount of the good in question at a 
fixed marginal cost. The incumbent always could license an-
other entrant, so any restriction it places on the number of 
stage 2 licenses is wholly artificial. Rather than suffer the unli-
censed entry and the harms associated with it, the incumbent 
can cut a deal with the entrant. The entrant will save the capi-
tal costs of entry if the entrant licenses from the incumbent and 
that saving should make a deal attractive.73 
                                                  
73 This analysis suggests that the basic over-entry problem described in the econom-
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Does this mean that mean we will see lots of entry? No. As 
the incumbent issues more licenses at stage 2, entry will be-
come less attractive at stage 3. The stage 3 potential entrant has 
to ask whether it can recover Ki, and eventually, as more li-
censes are issued by the incumbent, the incremental profits 
available to a potential entrant in the stage 4 Cournot game 
will drop below the capital costs. Indeed, if the capital costs are 
sufficiently large, the incumbent may face no real threat of en-
try. It will issue no licenses in stage 2—will not give access to 
its facilities to its competitors—and no firm will enter at stage 
3, as the profits available to the entrant at stage 4 in the result-
ing Cournot duopoly may not cover the fixed costs of entry. 
What does all of this mean for the question of mandatory 
access to the incumbent’s facilities? Two points. First, depend-
ing on capital costs, we may see incumbents grant lots of vol-
untary access. They do this not because they want competition, 
but because they inevitably would face competition through 
entrants building new facilities and the incumbent wants to 
structure that competition through its licenses and access terms 
rather than face uncontrolled competition. The incumbent also 
wants a chunk of the capital expenditures that will be saved 
from licensed rather than unlicensed entry. Second, we should 
not expect incumbents to grant the socially optimal amount of 
access. The incumbent grants access to deter uncontrolled en-
try, but that has no natural match to the amount of access that 
an omniscient social planner would want. 
                                                                                                     
ics literature (see, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry 
and Social Inefficiency, 17 Rand J. Econ. 48 (1986)) is substantially overstated. In 
this simple framework, we will have no overinvestment in facilities. We will always 
have only one facility, precisely the number that we want socially. 
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B. Three Quick Models 
I will set out three versions of the model. In the first, the 
incumbent faces a single entrant. In the second, we will look at 
unlimited entry without any possibility of contracting. In the 
third, we will consider contracts between the incumbent and 
potential entrants where the incumbent can give access to its 
facilities at a fixed price, while just charging a per unit cost set 
at marginal cost, and where the incumbent can control the 
number of firms it gives access to. 
1. THE INCUMBENT AND A SINGLE ENTRANT 
Consider the incumbent facing a single potential entrant. As-
sume a demand curve for the product given by p = a – bQ, a 
marginal cost of production of c, and fixed costs of entry KI 
and KE, for respectively, the incumbent and the entrant. If the 
entrant would not enter with its own facility, there is no reason 
for the incumbent to grant the potential entrant access to the 
incumbent’s facility. The entrant would only enter on its own if 
its profits in the resulting Cournot duopoly would exceed the 
fixed cost of building the facility. Entry costs are just KE and 
under the stylized model, the entrant’s profits under Cournot 
duopoly competition would just be given by: 









In this framework, the incumbent is better off just paying 
this amount to the entrant to stay out of the market. The com-
petition that would take place between the incumbent and the 
entrant works to their joint disadvantage. They gain, jointly, 
from avoiding the expenditure of KE and the profits squan-
dered—as compared to monopoly—from their competition. If 
the incumbent has the bargaining power, the incumbent should 
just pay the entrant the profits the entrant would earn if it en-
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tered by building a facility. This will make the entrant happy 
and allow the incumbent to preserve its monopoly. 
Put that way, we don’t get facilities-based competition nor 
does the incumbent monopolist give voluntary access to its fa-
cilities to the entrant. Indeed, we don’t get any entry at all. Are 
we missing something? The answer, of course, is yes. Any po-
tential entrant could show up and demand the no-entry bribe 
and nothing the incumbent has done in its dealings with the 
first potential entrant will prevent that. Indeed, in this scenario, 
the payment from the monopolist would almost certainly en-
courage other firms to appear claiming that they were going to 
enter. Note, importantly, that paying a bribe to one potential 
entrant does nothing to alter the entry incentives for another 
entrant. If the incumbent is charging a monopoly price and 
that is what attracted the first entrant, that will also attract the 
second entrant after the go-away bribe has been paid to the 
first. 
2. THE INCUMBENT AND MANY ENTRANTS: NO DEALS 
So we should reject the suggested outcome above. Consider the 
same situation but explicitly consider the possibility of many 
entrants. In this section, I will ignore possible deals and will 
just determine the equilibrium with uncontrolled entry. 
This is a version of Mankiw & Whinston.74 With the 
incumbent and Z entrants playing the Cournot game, we can 
specify outcomes for overall industry output and for the profits 
of the incumbent and the entrants: 
 
) 2 (






QFE  (2) 
                                                  
74 See, Mankiw & Whinston, supra note xx. 
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The zero profit condition determines the number of en-







2 * − −
=  (5) 
By construction, profits of the entrants are 0 in equilibrium. At 
that level of entry, the incumbent’s profit is KE – KI, though it 
would not choose to play if that amount was less than zero. In 
this version, we end up with lots of facilities competition. We 
get competition, which increases output and pushes down 
prices, but at the cost of wasted expenditures of Z* x KE. 
3. INCUMBENT AND ENTRANTS WITH FIXED FEE LICENSING. 
Suppose that the incumbent could give access to its facilities to 
potential entrants. Will it do so? This is the four-stage game 
described in Section II.A. Assume that the incumbent is re-
stricted to charging per unit costs equal to marginal cost. It can 
set any fixed fee for access that it would like and also gets to set 
the number of licensed firms that it wants to deal with. 
This is decidedly more complicated, but the ideas set forth 
in Section II.A. help to specify an answer quickly. The core 
idea, seen in Maurer and Scotchmer,75 is that the incumbent 
uses voluntary access to deter uncontrolled entry. The incum-
bent doesn’t want uncontrolled entry; in these simple examples, 
it is never optimal for the incumbent to ever have another firm 
                                                  
75 Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defense 
in Intellectual Property, 69 Economica 535 (2002). 
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actually do facilities-based competition. But as we saw in Sec-
tion II.B.1, the strategy of just paying off potential entrants is 
not an equilibrium strategy. The only way to keep out uncon-
trolled entry of the sort seen in Section II.B.2 is to license en-
try. If the entry is inevitable, the incumbent will do better in 
seeking to capture some of the capital expenditures saved from 
avoiding facilities-based entry. 
Suppose we have an incumbent and N licensed entrants 
(meaning N entrants given access to the facility voluntarily for 
a fee F). What constraints control what the incumbent can do? 
First, for this to be an equilibrium, no firm should want to en-
ter by building its own facilities. Put more precisely, the profits 
to be earned from uncontrolled entry when we add one firm to 
N+1 Cournot competitors (the incumbent plus the N licensed 
entrants) must be zero. Second, no licensed entrant should 
want to exit, either by stopping production completely, or more 
importantly, switching to building its own facilities and being 
an unlicensed entrant. For the game with the incumbent and N 
licensed entrants to be an equilibrium, the licensed entrant 
must earn in profits what it would earn if it switched to being 
an unlicensed entrant and competed in production with the 
incumbent and N-1 licensed firms. 
That may have sounded complex, but this works out fairly 
easily. The incumbent cannot charge firms more than KE to 
enter, since they can just build a facility at that price and enter. 
Having arbitrarily allocated the bargaining power to the in-
cumbent, the incumbent can fully extract the saved capital ex-
penditures, so it should set F equal to KE. 
How many licenses should the incumbent issue? In this 
version of the model, each participant in the Cournot game 
will face a marginal cost of c. This was true in the free entry 
version of the game in Section II.B.2. The Cournot quantities 
are determined just by the marginal cost and the number of 
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participants. Indeed in a game with the incumbent and N other 
participants—licensed or unlicensed—all facing marginal cost c 
overall production is given by: 
 
) 2 (






QG  (6) 
Recall that in Section II.B.2 Z* was the number of firms 
that would join the incumbent in the free entry game in which 
each firm bore an entry cost of KE. With the incumbent set-
ting F = KE, all participants face the same cost. Suppose that 
the incumbent issued N < Z*. Putting to one side the niceties 
of whether we have a whole number of entrants, if N < Z*, 
then an uncommitted firm can pay KE and enter and make 
money. We constructed Z* based on eliminating profits for 
firms entering and paying KE, and with fewer firms, profits 
would be available. We should thus get N* = Z*, meaning we 
reach the same equilibrium as in the free entry game, save for 
one important point. 
In the free entry game, KE x Z* is wasted, as we end up 
with unproductive facilities-based competition. In the game 
with voluntary licensing, all of that is paid to the incumbent, so 
social welfare is improved by the full amount KE x Z*. Profits 
by the incumbent rise by exactly that amount as well.  
In this framework, we get as much voluntary access as we 
would facilities-based entry absent access. Indeed, if you 
woodenly believed in facilities-based entry, you would need to 
bar access deals between incumbents and potential entrants to 
get facilities-based competition. The incumbent is able to use 
licensing to the entrants as a way of committing to an overall 
industry-level of production that makes independent entry un-
attractive. The monopolist could just set an entry-deterring 
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price but how does he commit to it? Licensing to others be-
comes the commitment device.76 
D. Mandatory Sharing 
What role does mandatory sharing play in this framework? 
First, depending on the parameter values, the incumbent may 
face very little—or even no—entry. In that situation, the in-
cumbent will not share its facility and will instead keep its mo-
nopoly. In that case, since no entrant will enter having to build 
its own facility, if we are going to have competition, it will need 
to be induced through sharing. When no firm will enter on its 
own, sharing might be said to be “necessary”—echoing obvi-
ously the language of Sec. 251(d)(2)—to achieve competition. 
Second, even if the incumbent does face entry and it therefore 
voluntarily gives access to entrants, it will charge the entrant’s 
full capital expenditures. That will deter entry, more so than a 
social planner would desire. 
But reality would take us closer to the desired result. The 
discussion above arbitrarily assigned bargaining power to the 
incumbent, which allowed the incumbent to extract the full 
cost of building a competing facility. At that point, the entrant 
is just indifferent between striking a deal with the incumbent 
                                                  
76 So far, we have just let the incumbent select the number of licenses that it wishes 
to offer and to set a fixed fee for entry. An incumbent might consider adding a roy-
alty, so that licensed firms paid a per-unit fee for each quantity of the good that they 
purchased from the incumbent. Unsurprisingly, the incumbent can use either the 
number of licenses or the royalty to deter unlicensed entry. See Robert E. Hall, Op-
timal Contracts to Defend Upstream Monopoly 23 (January 25, 2000). [Once the in-
cumbent sets a royalty rate that deters uncontrolled entry, then the issue is choosing 
the number of licensees is what number of licensees maximizes overall profits. The 
answer should be zero, but what this really means here is that the incumbent should 
drop out and charge a fully-extracting lump sum fee to the single licensee. The in-
cumbent can’t do this on its own as it can’t contract with itself and the contract with 
the licensee parallels the contracts as barrier to entry idea seen in Aghion and Bol-
ton.] 
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and building a facility. Of course, if the entrant built a facility, 
it could sell access to others in competition with the incum-
bent. The incumbent preserves its facilities monopoly and 
hence monopoly as the sole source of production by avoiding 
entry. That is going to create bargaining power for an entrant 
and push entry closer to what a social planner would desire. 
III. Product Differentiation and Facilities-Based Competition 
Section II considers the case of one product produced under a 
natural monopoly technology. We saw there that we should 
not want facilities-based competition and should not expect to 
get it, with or without a policy of mandatory access. Absent the 
mandatory access policy, if the entrant would enter by building 
a facility, the incumbent will voluntarily give the entrant access 
to the facility. If the entrant won’t build, the incumbent will 
deny access. Either way, we will not see facilities-based compe-
tition. With mandatory access, if the entrant would otherwise 
be willing to enter by building a facility, the entrant will buy 
access through the incumbent, either at the regulated price, if 
that is below the negotiated price, or at the negotiated price if 
the regulated price exceeds that. Again, we will see no facili-
ties-based competition. With mandatory access, if the entrant 
would not be willing to build its own facility, the entrant still 
will not do so, but it may buy access through the incumbent if 
the access price is sufficiently attractive. In this simple set-
ting—one product and one natural monopoly technology—
mandatory access can alter the number of reselling competitors, 
but it doesn’t alter the amount of facilities-based competition. 
We should drop the one product/one technology assump-
tion. I will examine the issue of multiple products given the 
FCC’s focus on product differentiation. The possibility of 
product differentiation is described as one of the key potential 
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benefits of facilities-based competition. There are two ways to 
frame this inquiry. In the first, I will continue to think of the 
facility as single, one-piece facility with two possible products, 
in the second model, we will break the facility into pieces and 
work with a two-piece facility. 
A. One Facility/Multiple Products  
So consider a situation in which the incumbent produces one 
product from its facility and an entrant would like to produce a 
second product. If the new product can’t be produced using the 
existing facility, then we just have a question of whether the 
market for the new product is sufficiently large to support a 
new facility. Access to the existing facility—either through vol-
untary access or required mandatory access—is irrelevant. 
If the new product can be produced using the existing facil-
ity, then the access question matters. We need to understand 
the extent to which the new product is a substitute or comple-
ment for the incumbent’s preexisting product. To start with the 
simple case, assume that the entrant’s new product would have 
no effect on demand for the incumbent’s product and could be 
produced from the incumbent’s facility without altering the 
production costs for the existing product. In that case, the in-
cumbent should regard the new product as found money. It as 
if the incumbent’s phone system can produce ordinary phone 
service and, all off a sudden, avocados. We should expect the 
incumbent and the entrant to strike a deal to use the incum-
bent’s facility to produce avocados and we should not expect or 
want facilities-based competition. Again, the price of access 
would clearly matter. We might induce much more investment 
in innovation by potential entrants into non-traditional uses of 
the phone system if the entrant knows that it can gain access to 
the system at favorable prices. But the level of facilities-based 
competition shouldn’t turn on these prices. 
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To consider a perhaps more realistic situation, focus on a 
case in which the new product couldn’t be produced using the 
incumbent’s facility. The new facility required to produce the 
product would also make it possible for an entrant to produce 
the incumbent’s old product, in addition to the new product. 
To make this as simple as possible, if the entrant builds the 
new facility, assume that the entrant will have a monopoly in 
the new product market and will compete as a Cournot duopo-
list with the incumbent in the old product market. Assume as 
before that the new product doesn’t alter demand for the old 
product. 
Potential profits to the entrant are the monopoly profits in 
the new market plus the duopoly profits in the old market less 
the cost of the new facility. Under what circumstances do we 
want the new facility to be built? When will it be built? The 
straightforward answer is that the joint interests of the incum-
bent and the entrant will determine whether a new facility is 
built. Giving mandatory access won’t influence increase the 
amount of facilities-based competition; actually barring deals 
between the incumbent and the entrant would increase the ex-
tent of facilities-based competition and might be justified un-
der some circumstances. 
To see this, we need to consider a number of cases. Just as 
we saw in the single-product setting, if standalone entry is not 
profitable, the entrant won’t enter and the incumbent will not 
give access to the entrant to the existing facility. So if the du-
opoly profits in the old market plus the monopoly profits in the 
new market are less than the cost of the new facility, the en-
trant won’t build it. Given that, the incumbent doesn’t face a 
genuine threat of entry and would not give access to its facility 
to the entrant voluntarily. Mandatory access could in theory 
improve matters, but in that case, we have just returned to the 
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one product model, as by assumption, we need the new facility 
to get the new product. 
If the duopoly profits in the old market plus the monopoly 
profits in the new market exceed the cost of the new facility, 
the entrant will build the new facility, unless access to the in-
cumbent’s facility would alter that result. If the monopoly prof-
its in the new market alone exceed the cost of the facility, the 
entrant will enter through facilities-based competition. The 
new facility makes sense just looking at the new product mar-
ket, and the ability to compete with the incumbent in the old 
product market is gravy. 
If profits in the new market don’t cover the costs of the 
new facility, matters get more complicated. The incumbent 
knows that it faces the threat of entry, since the entrant’s com-
bined profits in the two markets would justify building the fa-
cility. The incumbent should therefore cut a deal with the en-
trant to give access to its facility to create duopoly competition 
in the old market. This will be attractive to the entrant, as it 
saves the cost of building the facility. 
Take stock. The existence of the possible second market in-
creases the circumstances under which the incumbent would 
voluntarily choose to give access to the entrant. When the sec-
ond facility is privately justifiable, it will be built, but otherwise 
not. In some of those cases, the voluntary access deal between 
the incumbent and the entrant might prevent a socially-
justified facility from being built. Even though monopoly prof-
its in the second market might not induce private building of 
the facility, profits in that market plus consumer surplus at mo-
nopoly prices might exceed the cost of the facility. In that case, 
blocking a voluntary deal between the incumbent and the en-
trant would enhance welfare. And, obviously, in this frame-
work, what matters is access to the incumbent’s facility, 
whether voluntary or mandatory. A mandatory access rule 
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would have the same effect: it might reduce facilities-based 
competition and reduce overall welfare by reducing the incen-
tive to enter the new products market. 
B. The Two-Piece Facility 
To frame this simply, consider a two-piece facility providing 
two services. So think two pieces—the local telephone network 
and long-distance lines—and two services—local calling and 
long-distance calling. Consider an entrant contemplating the 
possibility of building a competing long-distance transmission 
facility (call the entrant MCI for short). The entrant needs ac-
cess to a local facility to provide the long-distance service. The 
model described so far says that the entrant will compare the 
profits to be earned over time after entry with the fixed costs of 
building a new facility. If the entrant has to build both pieces, 
the entrant presumably will build then enter the market for 
both services simultaneously (obviously, the entrant can only 
provide one service if providing the second service is a money 
loser, even having already committed to building both pieces of 
the facility). 
Absent unbundling, the entrant focuses on the capital costs 
of building both pieces of the network—local and long dis-
tance—and compares those to the expected discounted profits 
from entering both markets. If those costs exceed the profits, 
the entrant stays out, and, the entrant also cannot credibly 
threaten entry and negotiate for access to the incumbent’s facil-
ity. 
This is just to repeat the result of Section II. Now imagine 
that we give the entrant mandatory access to the local network. 
The potential long-distance entrant now just compares the 
capital costs of building the second piece of the network—the 
long-distance transmission facility—with the expected profits 
from providing that service. Entry just in long-distance might 
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be attractive even though entering in both pieces might be un-
attractive. 
We should be clear that this is not a cream-skimming story, 
or at least not necessarily so. The incumbent might find it quite 
profitable to build a local network and also profitable to add 
long-distance transmission as a second service over new facili-
ties tied to its local network. Absent the unbundling, the in-
cumbent not give voluntary access to the local network so as to 
facilitate the long-distance entry, as that just weakens the in-
cumbent’s competitive position in the long-distance market. 
We still have not reached facilities-based competition in 
the long distance market. As just discussed, once we allow 
mandatory access to the local network, we may create a credible 
threat of entry in long-distance facilities. With the credible 
threat, if the long-distance facility is also a natural monopoly 
facility, we should expect the incumbent to rent access to that 
facility to the entrant. 
In that scenario, unbundling the network and creating 
mandatory access to those pieces that we clearly believe to be 
natural monopolies does not create facilities-based entry in the 
complementary pieces of the network. But if the complemen-
tary facility is not a natural monopoly facility, then it is possible 
that we will get a second facility when we would not absent the 
unbundling. 
C. Assessing Unbundling and Facilities-Based Competition 
All of this suggests that facilities-based competition and man-
datory shared access are largely orthogonal issues. They just 
don’t have much to do with each other. Mandatory access itself 
may matter in four ways. First, we can create non-facilities 
based competition, for example, pure resale competition. We 
should be able to create more resale competition through regu-
lation than would obtain through private agreements between 
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the incumbent and potential entrants. Moreover, the existence 
of resale competition may make it possible for the regulator to 
shift out of final market price regulation to regulation in the 
input/access market. That might be useful as it might change 
the information available to the regulators. With final market 
regulation, information is provided by the regulated firm and 
perhaps a dispersed group of consumers. With input regula-
tion, we may get a number of firms buying from the incumbent 
and those firms may be able to provide meaningful information 
to the regulators. 
Second, mandatory access lowers the price of access paid by 
the entrant. If the regulated access price is set too high, the in-
cumbent and the entrant will negotiate around it. If the price is 
set below the price that would emerge in negotiations between 
the entrant and the incumbent, the entrant benefits and the 
incumbent loses. This of course is just a transfer, and while this 
may raise interesting legal issues as to whether there has been a 
taking, in the standard economic model, the transfer is a wash. 
Third, mandatory access can create inefficient use incentives. If 
access is priced per unit and the access price is below marginal 
cost, the entrant will overconsume the output and that repre-
sents a real social loss. Fourth, as noted above, and perhaps 
most importantly, mandatory access might alter investment de-
cisions. Potential entrants may wait rather than undertake new 
investment so as to allocate the risk of failure to the incumbent. 
Given that asymmetry, the incumbent may wait as well. 
It would be natural to think that the ILEC access rules 
might actually reduce the extent of facilities-based competition. 
The claim would run something like this. The broad statutory 
right of resale makes the ILEC into a wholesale provider to 
potential entrants and makes possible ready resale competi-
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tion.77 An entrant who might otherwise enter by building its 
own facility might choose instead to simply resell the services 
of the incumbent. Even more: if the unbundled network ele-
ment rules are so broad as to enable the entrant to get full-
blown telecommunications services at cost-based prices—
instead of at wholesale prices as specified by the resale rules78—
potential entrants would have even more reason to rely on the 
incumbent’s facilities and opt out of facilities-based competi-
tion. 
The ongoing dispute over the scope of the unbundling ob-
ligation is largely a fight about price. Consider so-called UNE-
p or UNE-platform access—sufficiently broad unbundling of 
individual network elements so that an entrant can get whole 
telecommunications services by purchasing all of the unbundled 
elements. As the FCC has emphasized, UNE-p access is not 
an independent policy of the FCC but rather a result that 
emerges spontaneously when decisions about unbundling indi-
vidual elements effectively make the entire local network avail-
able to the entrant.79 The ILECs argued in Iowa Utilities that 
unbundling had to be sufficiently narrow so as to make the re-
sale at wholesale prices provision meaningful, and that com-
plete unbundling at cost-based prices undercut that. Whatever 
one thinks of that argument and of the FCC’s February 20
th 
decision to seemingly preserve UNE-p access in the face of 
                                                  
77 An ILEC has the duty “to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunica-
tions service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers who are not telecommu-
nications carriers,” 47 USC § 251(c)(4)(A), and may not impose restrictions on re-
sale. 47 USC § 251(c)(4)(B). 
78 Id. 
79 See Michael Powell, Competition Issues in the Telecommunications Industry, 
Written Statement before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion, U.S. Senate, January 14, 2003, p. iii. 
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strong opposition to that result,80 this ultimately a question 
about the price of access, namely whether entrant buy at 
wholesale prices or cost-based prices. 
What might facilities-based competition accomplish? First, 
full-blown facilities-based competition would allow regulators 
to exit pricing, both final-market pricing of services to custom-
ers and input pricing of facility or service access by, typically, 
incumbents to entrants. If full pricing exit is the goal, facilities-
based competition is almost certainly required.81 Second, facili-
ties-based competition would create redundancy in the local 
telecommunications network. So, of course, would having the 
incumbent build a second network. It is hard to know how to 
assess this. To continue with my concern over breakfast, you 
have heard that toast is a good alternative to cereal, so you con-
sider buying a toaster. Do you buy one or two toasters? Buying 
one means that on the morning the toaster breaks, you can’t 
have toast. There will be a delay while you acquire a new 
toaster, and during that time, you are cut off from toast. We 
need to weigh the risk of a service interruption and the costs 
associated with that against the costs of building a second facil-
ity early. Those costs include not just a present value of capi-
                                                  
80 See Powell, supra note xx, at 2 (“The Majority apparently is a big fan of UNE-P, 
because it has contorted the letter and spirit of the statute and the court’s interpreta-
tion of our responsibilities in an effort to ensure its indefinite preservation.”) 
81 And at least some members of the FCC see this as the precise point of facilities-
based competition. See Separate Statement of Commissioner Kevin J. Martin, In 
the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent 
Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC 01-361, December 
20, 2001) (“As I have stated, the promotion of facilities-based competition should 
be a fundamental priority of this Commission. The goal of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 was to establish an environment that promotes meaningful competition 
and allows for deregulation. To get to true deregulation, we need facilities-based 
competition. Without such competition, we will always need a regulatory body to set 
wholesale and retail prices.”) 
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tal—money spent today rather than tomorrow—but also the 
fact that we will lock in technology that will seem outdated 
tomorrow. So redundancy is far from free, but without much 
more analysis, I can’t tell you whether we should have one net-
work, or two or more. 
IV. Unbundling Rules: Again and Again and Again? 
Section 251 lays out the general duties regarding interconnec-
tion, a key part of facilitating competitive telecommunications 
markets. The section proceeds by setting increasingly specific 
and rigorous duties for participants in the market. Section 
251(a) sets out general duties for all telecommunications carri-
ers; section 251(b) additional duties for all local exchange carri-
ers; and section 251(c) sets forth more duties for incumbent 
local exchange carriers, including the three core duties of inter-
connection, unbundled access and resale set out in the Intro-
duction. 
Section 251(d) then turns to implementation of these du-
ties and section 251(d)(2) sets forth the key access standards at 
stake in Iowa Utilities, USTA I and USTA II. That subsection 
instructs the Commission in determining what network ele-
ments to require to “consider, at a minimum, whether (A) ac-
cess to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is 
necessary; and (B) the failure to provide access to such network 
elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications 
carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to of-
fer.”82 
In Iowa Utilities, the Supreme Court judged the Commis-
sion’s first set of unbundling rules against the standards of Sec-
tion 251(d)(2). The Court understood Section 251(d)(2)(A) to 
                                                  
82 47 USC § 251(d)(2). 
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set forth a particularly tough standard for access to proprietary 
elements—elements where patent, copyright, trademark or 
trade secret protection might be implicated—and a somewhat 
weaker standard for access to nonproprietary elements. The 
Court concluded that the FCC had “simply failed” to offer 
some limiting standard to Sec. 251(d)(2) in embracing rules 
that called for broad unbundling of the local phone network. In 
particular, in evaluating the “impairment” standard of Section 
251(d)(2)(B), the FCC had failed to consider the possibility of 
self-provisioning—the entrant might be able to supply its own 
element—or purchasing access to the element from a third-
party provider. 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Iowa Utilities 
overturning the first set of unbundling rules, the FCC has 
issued two sets of revised rules. Neither has made it through 
the D.C. Circuit. In USTA I, the D.C. Circuit overturned the 
FCC’s second set of general unbundling rules and also rejected 
the Line Sharing Order which had required separate unbun-
dling of the high-frequency portion of the local loop (the so-
called “HFPL”). 
The Commission rewrote the unbundling rules based on 
what the Commission learned from USTA I. The FCC’s third 
set of unbundling rules, announced on February 20, 2003 but 
released on August 21, 2003, fully reset—in a 576-page 
download—the unbundling rules. In USTA II, these rules too 
were found wanting. Taken together, the second and third set 
of rules and USTA I and USTA II cover a great deal of ground. 
USTA I put the FCC to the task of evaluating the unbundling 
rules market-by-market, with particularized assessments of 
competition in each local telephone market.83 In the third set 
                                                  
83 USTA I, 290 F.3d at 422 (“As to almost every element, the Commission chose to 
adopt a uniform national rule, mandating the element’s unbundling in every geo-
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of unbundling rules, the Commission sought to harness state 
commissions to help with that process, but the D.C. Circuit 
found that “attempted punt” unsatisfactory.84 Together, USTA 
I and USTA II raise what I suspect are interesting questions 
about texture in regulations and how resources can be har-
nessed to supply that texture—and remember that the 1996 
Act required the FCC to issue implementing rules within six 
months!85  
 But these are not my issues here. Instead, I will settle for 
addressing two issues of competition policy: the role of inter-
modal competition in establishing broadband unbundling rules 
(competition from cable modems, for example) and the possi-
bility of voluntary provisioning by incumbents given the fear of 
access at TELRIC prices. 
A. Broadband Sharing and Intermodal Competition 
It took the D.C. Circuit less than two F.3d pages in USTA I to 
overturn the Line-Sharing Order, which, as you will recall, re-
quired the local incumbents to give access to the high-
frequency part of the local phone wires, which would allow en-
trants to provide broadband Internet service (DSL) over the 
local phone network. 
The D.C. Circuit admonished the FCC for failing “to con-
sider the relevance of competition in broadband services com-
                                                                                                     
graphic market and customer class, without regard to the state of competitive im-
pairment in any particular market. As a result, UNEs will be available to CLECs in 
many markets where there is no reasonable basis for thinking that competition is 
suffering from any impairment of a sort that might have been the object of Con-
gress’s concern.”) 
84 USTA II, xxx F.3d at xxx (“We therefore hold that, while federal agency officials 
may subdelegate their decision-making authority to subordinates absent evidence of 
contrary congressional intent, they may not subdelegate to outside entities—private 
or sovereign—absent affirmative evidence of authority to do so.” 
85 47 USC 251(d)(1). 
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ing from cable (and to a lesser extent satellite),” and looked to 
the overall level of competition in the broadband market.86 
That seems like an odd approach, given that the impairment 
standard of Sec. 251(d)(2)(B) is quite clear that the question is 
whether the potential entrant can provide the services it seeks 
to provide without access to the element. This makes no refer-
ence to the overall level of competition in the market but in-
stead just focuses on whether the entrant can provide service 
without access to the element. 
So the FCC argued before the D.C. Circuit. But the court 
found this reading of Sec. 251(d) “quite unreasonable,” fol-
lowed by the obligatory cite to Chevron. Relying in the main on 
Justice Breyer’s opinion in Iowa Utilities, where he concurred in 
part and dissented in part, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that 
the Supreme Court had insisted on some limits to unbundling 
and further noted that unbundling was costly, with regard to 
both the incumbent’s incentive to build new facilities and the 
costs of coordinating shared use of facilities. That meant, as the 
Court said in Iowa Utilities, looking to the availability of ele-
ments outside the incumbent’s network. Thus, concluded the 
D.C. Circuit, the FCC’s “naked disregard of the competitive 
context” imposed costs “where it had no reason to think that 
doing so would bring on a significant enhancement of competi-
tion.”87 
There is the D.C. Circuit’s mistake. Yes, Iowa Utilities does 
make clear that in delimiting unbundling we must take into 
account the availability of elements outside the incumbent’s 
network. That is to say, if there already is a wholesale market in 
an element, adding one more supplier to that market—the in-
cumbent through involuntary unbundling—may not matter for 
                                                  
86 USTA I, 290 F.3d at 428. 
87 Id. at 429. 
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the entrant’s ability to provide the service in question. Of 
course it might matter as well, since an entrant facing a whole-
sale monopolist might not be able to enter at monopoly prices; 
adding the incumbent to the wholesale market might create 
sufficient competitive pressure to make entry possible. 
But if there is not a wholesale market for the element, the 
fact that we may see some—even substantial—competition at 
the retail level tells us nothing about whether the entrant can 
buy the element so as to provide its service. A robust retail 
market doesn’t necessarily entail a robust wholesale market in 
the elements used to create the service sold at retail; in truth, 
the retail market context in services tells you nothing about the 
state of the wholesale market in the elements. The D.C. Cir-
cuit’s mistake is to conflate wholesale and retail.  
The state of the overall market does seem relevant in as-
sessing unbundling of proprietary elements, which is subject to 
the “necessary” standard of Sec. 251(d)(2)(A). If the market is 
in some basic sense adequately providing services already, it is 
hard to think that it is somehow necessary to unbundle the re-
quested elements. 
The Court’s analysis in Iowa Utilities says that self-
provisioning or access to an element from a third party are im-
portant for understanding whether the absence of access to the 
element through the ILEC “would impair the ability of the 
telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the ser-
vices that it seeks to offer.” Absolutely. The ability of an en-
trant to provide the element itself or buy access to the element 
from a third party clearly relates to whether it needs access to 
the element from the ILEC. The failure to consider those pos-
sibilities in assessing “impairment” rendered the initial unbun-
dling rules infirm. 
But that question is quite different from an assessment of 
whether there is “enough” competition in the marketplace for a 
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particular service such that additional entry isn’t required. The 
D.C. Circuit conflates these two distinct ideas in running 
roughshod over the FCC’s interpretation of Sec. 251(d)(2)(B). 
Cable companies may be actively providing high-speed cable 
modem service, but unless they voluntarily enter the wholesale 
market—or are forced to become wholesalers under other 
rules88—the availability of retail service has nothing to do with 
whether an entrant can procure a necessary element from the 
cable company. 
  Nothing in Sec. 251’s unbundling regime contemplates 
that the Commission is to set rules with an eye towards getting 
just enough competition. Given the historic difficulties associ-
ated with making that assessment—recall the discussion above 
of MCI’s entry—it would have been quite sensible for Con-
gress to delegate the entry decision to the entrant. And, of 
course, as a general matter, we don’t regulate entry. If I want to 
start a restaurant serving British dim sum—one of my col-
league’s examples—I get to do that, and when the restaurant 
fails, we use the bankruptcy system to reallocate assets to 
higher and better uses. The FCC’s original reading of Sec. 
251(d)(2)(B) pushes us exactly in the direction of empowering 
private actors to make entry decisions. They bear the losses as-
sociated with mistakes rather than being “protected” from mis-
taken entry decisions by being told by the government that we 
currently have enough competition in this sector. The D.C. 
Circuit’s reading of Sec. 251(d)(2)(b) substitutes government 
assessment of the need for entry for private assessments backed 
by real dollars. That reading seems inconsistent with the lan-
guage of the statute and inconsistent with how we should want 
risks to be borne.  
                                                  
88 Cite Brand X decision on this; more treatment of this? 
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B. LEC Provisioning and the End of TELRIC 
In Iowa Utilities, in evaluating the “impairment” standard of 
Section 251(d)(2)(B), the Supreme Court concluded that the 
FCC failed to consider the possibility of self-provisioning—the 
entrant might be able to supply its own element—or purchas-
ing access to the element from a third-party provider. In USTA 
II, the D.C. Circuit has pushed beyond this to now require 
that the mandatory unbundling rules be sensitive to what alter-
natives are voluntarily offered by the incumbent.89 The FCC 
considered this possibility in implementing the third set of 
rules but recognized that “[s]uch an approach would give the 
incumbent LECs unilateral power to avoid unbundling at 
TELRIC rates simply by voluntarily making elements available 
at some higher price.”90 
This is the end of TELRIC pricing. Focus on how the en-
trant gains access to the element in question. The entrant 
might not be able to enter without access to the element. That 
is, if the entrant had to self-provision, entry costs would be too 
high and the entrant would stay out. As argued before, on 
those hypothetical facts, the incumbent would not choose to 
give the entrant access, as the incumbent faces no real threat of 
entry. 
But the statute creates a second threat of access, beyond 
that of actual facilities-based entry and self-provisioning. The 
FCC can order access to the element, and if it does so, given its 
interpretation of the applicable cost standard, it will order ac-
cess at TELRIC prices. That threat, in turn, creates a second 
reason for the incumbent to create “voluntary” access. If the 
                                                  
89 “What the Commission may not do is compare unbundling only to self-
provisioning or third-party provisioning, arbitrarily excluding alternatives offered by 
the LEC.” P. 33. 
90 Third Order at ¶ 102. 
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incumbent can set a higher price for access to the element and 
thereby avoid TELRIC-priced access, the incumbent is better 
off, assuming of course that the incumbent is right about the 
threat posed by the FCC. 
The D.C. Circuit approach does not read Sec. 251(c)(3) 
out of the statute in some sense: that section creates a threat of 
access that induces an offer from the LEC of voluntary access 
at a higher-than-TELRIC price. But the D.C. Circuit ap-
proach does mean that we should never see access at TELRIC 
rates. Or, more precisely, entrants who cannot enter without 
access at TELRIC prices will get access at those prices, but en-
trant who can enter at higher prices will pay those rates instead 
at prices set by the incumbents. Or we well see access at 
TELRIC rates only when the incumbent has miscalculated by 
setting an access rate that actually does impair entry under Sec-
tion 251(d)(2). 
This creates a rather perverse set of incentives for the en-
trant. If I gain access at TELRIC prices initially and make a 
bunch of money, do my profits now prove that I can afford 
higher access rates and therefore in subsequent price setting, 
the incumbent can set a rate to fully extract my profits? It is 
difficult to imagine a stronger brake on entry. If profits trans-
late directly into higher confiscatory access prices, there is very 
little reason to enter in the first place. 
The D.C. Circuit might seek to avoid that path by relying 
on the wholesale pricing rules under Sec. 251(c)(4) and 
252(d)(3) to cap the prices that the incumbent could charge, 
but that is only a partial response at best. Sec. 251(c)(4) creates 
an access regime for entire “telecommunication services,” and 
not just for unbundled elements of the network. Think of a 
telecommunications service as a much larger bundle of ele-
ments and you see the problem: the entrant might be forced 
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into buying services that it doesn’t want to obtain wholesale 
price access to the element. 
A broader response would focus on the way in which this 
profits-taking regime would impair entry. No upside, no entry, 
and so entry is impaired in the language of Sec. 251(d)(2). But 
now it isn’t clear where we get a limiting principle. The D.C. 
Circuit has been understandably concerned that the sharing 
regime would diminish investment incentives. Entrants would 
hang back and hope to free ride on successful investments by 
incumbents, while the incumbents would get stuck alone with 
the losers. But we face exactly the same issue here. Entrants 
who enter and can’t succeed go away; those who succeed pay 
more once the incumbent “chooses” to give access to the ele-
ment at higher-than-TELRIC prices.  
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